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The spread of Zika virus in the Americas has been associated with a surge in Guillain-Barré syndrome (GBS)
cases. Given the severity of GBS, territories affected by Zika virus need to plan health-care resources to manage
GBS patients. To inform such planning in Martinique, we analyzed Zika virus surveillance and GBS data from
Martinique in real time with a modeling framework that captured dynamics of the Zika virus epidemic, the risk of
GBS in Zika virus–infected persons, and the clinical management of GBS cases. We compared our estimates
with those from the 2013–2014 Zika virus epidemic in French Polynesia. We were able to predict just a few weeks
into the epidemic that, due to lower transmission potential and lower probability of developing GBS following infec-
tion in Martinique, the total number of GBS cases in Martinique would be substantially lower than suggested by
simple extrapolations from French Polynesia. We correctly predicted that 8 intensive-care beds and 7 ventilators
would be sufficient to treat GBS cases. This study showcased the contribution of modeling to inform local health-
care planning during an outbreak. Timely studies that estimate the proportion of infected persons that seek care
are needed to improve the predictive power of such approaches.
epidemic forecasts; Guillain-Barré syndrome; health-care planning; Zika virus
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An epidemic of Zika virus (ZIKV) infections is ongoing
in the Americas. Intense local transmission is currently
reported in large swaths of South America (1–3). As of
December 2, 2016, 50 countries and territories have reported
ZIKV cases (4). The main route of transmission to humans
is through bites of infected Aedes mosquitoes (5). Human-
to-human transmission may also occur via sexual contact
(6) or blood transfusion (7).
ZIKV infection is often asymptomatic or may give rise to
mild symptoms such as fever, rash, joint pain, and conjunc-
tivitis (8). However, there is now strong evidence that ZIKV
infection is associated with congenital malformations, such as
microcephaly in infants born to mothers infected during preg-
nancy (9–12), and neuropathies such as Guillain-Barré syn-
drome (GBS) (13–15), a usually rare autoimmune disease
that can result in near-total paralysis. In response to the
increased reporting of such complications in the Americas,
the World Health Organization declared ZIKV a public health
emergency of international concern on February 1, 2016 (16).
GBS is a severe, acute paralytic neuropathy, which usu-
ally follows an infection or other immune stimulation (17).
Clinical management of GBS patients includes intravenous
administration of immunoglobulin or plasmapheresis ac-
cording to severity. During the 2013–2014 ZIKV epidemic
in French Polynesia, a group of islands with 270,000 inhabi-
tants, 42 ZIKV-associated GBS cases (1.6 per 10,000 inha-
bitants) were observed, 16 (38%) needed intensive care, and
12 (29%) also required mechanical ventilation (14).
Given the severity of GBS, it is important that countries af-
fected by ZIKV evaluate the resources they will need to
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manage GBS patients, in particular in terms of intensive-care
bed capacity and mechanical ventilators. French authorities
were confronted with these issues in December 2015, when a
ZIKV epidemic started in Martinique, a French island of
380,000 inhabitants in the Caribbean Sea. What would be the
expected number of GBS cases in Martinique? What would
be the number of GBS cases requiring intensive care or me-
chanical ventilation during the epidemic? Prior to the out-
break, the intensive care wards in Martinique had a capacity
of 8 ventilators. Was this capacity sufficient, or did it need to
be increased?
To support health-care planning, we analyzed ZIKV sur-
veillance and GBS data from Martinique in real time with a
modeling framework that captured ZIKV epidemic dynamics,
the risk of GBS in ZIKV-infected persons, and the clinical
management of GBS cases. To reduce uncertainty about key
epidemic parameters at the start of the epidemic in Marti-
nique, our analysis was informed by prior knowledge ac-
quired during the 2013–2014 ZIKV epidemic in French
Polynesia. The framework was used for the real-time charac-
terization and monitoring of the epidemic in Martinique and
for the forecasting of needs in health care. Results of these
analyses were shared with French authorities to inform plan-
ning (18). While a number of modeling studies have focused
on improving the ability to characterize and predict epidemic
trajectories in real time (19–23), our approach went a step fur-
ther by explicitly modeling and predicting specific health-care
requirements, such as bed capacity and ventilator availability,
that are more directly relevant for health-care planning.
METHODS
Data on the 2013–2014 epidemic in French Polynesia
The weekly number of patients who attended consultations
for suspected ZIKV infection was estimated from the data pro-
vided by the local sentinel surveillance system during the
ZIKV epidemic. The surveillance system included an average
of approximately 50 sentinel sites, covering 30% of all general
practitioners in the territory. From these data we extrapolated
the total number of consultations. Patients with suspected
infection were those who presented with rash, fever with tem-
perature lower than 38.5°C, or both and with at least 2 of the
following symptoms: conjunctivitis, joint pain with or without
muscle pain, and limb edema. Laboratory confirmation of
infection was obtained for a small proportion of the cases.
Forty-two GBS cases were diagnosed during the ZIKV
epidemic (14). Thirty-seven (88%) of these patients also re-
ported ZIKV-associated symptoms prior to the onset of GBS,
and all had ZIKV-neutralizing antibodies. Sixteen cases (38%)
needed intensive care, and 12 (29%) also required mechanical
ventilation. Detailed clinical data were recorded at hospital
admission and up to 3 months after discharge (14). For each
GBS patient we used the dates of ZIKV-associated symptoms
(when reported), GBS symptom onset, intensive care unit
(ICU) admission and discharge (when applicable), and the start
and end of the mechanical ventilation (when applicable).
A first serological survey, which was conducted on a subset
of the general population (n = 196) recruited in February–
March 2014, estimated the ZIKV seroprevalence at 49% (24).
However, this survey was conducted before the end of the
outbreak. To fit our model, we therefore relied on another
serological survey conducted after the epidemic (May–June
2014), which found a seroprevalence of 66% in a sample of
476 schoolchildren (24). We assumed that seroprevalence in
the general population would be similar to that in school-aged
children.
Demographic data for the year 2014 were obtained from
the French Polynesia Statistical Institute website (25).
Data on the epidemic in Martinique
We used the estimated weekly number of consultations
for suspected ZIKV infection and data on hospitalized GBS
cases—including the dates of hospitalization, ICU admis-
sion and discharge (when applicable), and start and end of
mechanical ventilation (when applicable)—provided by the
French Institute for Public Health Surveillance (26). The
weekly number of consultations for suspected ZIKV infec-
tion was estimated from the sentinel surveillance data of a
network comprising 20% of the general practitioners of
Martinique. As of week 32 in 2016, 26 GBS cases were re-
ported, of whom 14 (30%) needed intensive care and 11
(42%) also required mechanical ventilation.
Weeks 5, 6, 12, 13, 14, 18, 20, and 28 in 2016 had large
uncertainties in the estimated number of consultations for
ZIKV due to the closure of several sentinel sites for holi-
days. We therefore did not use these data points for model
fitting. We did, however, use the weekly number of hospita-
lized GBS cases for those weeks, because hospital admis-
sions were not affected by the holidays.
Demographic data for the year 2015 were taken from the
French National Institute for Statistics and Economic
Studies website (27).
Mathematical model
We developed a mathematical model that captured the
ZIKV epidemic dynamics, the risk of GBS in ZIKV-infected
persons, and the clinical management of GBS patients.
To characterize the dynamics of ZIKV infections, asso-
ciated consultations, and GBS presentations, we used a simple,
deterministic susceptible-infectious-recovered compartmental
model with 6 parameters: 1) the reproduction number R0—the
average number of secondary ZIKV cases generated by a
single infectious individual in a completely susceptible popu-
lation; 2) the average infectious period; 3) the number of
infected persons I0 at the time the first consultations for sus-
pected ZIKV infection were reported; 4) the proportion of in-
fected persons who consulted practitioners for ZIKV-related
symptoms (probability of seeking care ρ); 5) the probability
pGBS of developing GBS once infected with ZIKV; and 6) an
additional parameter δ to capture overdispersion in the ob-
served number Ct of consultations for week t. We assumed
that Ct had a negative binomial distribution with mean Et pre-
dicted by the model and overdispersion parameter kt = (Et)
δ
(more detail in Web Appendix 1, available at http://aje.
oxfordjournals.org/).
We then simulated the trajectory of the clinical manage-
ment of GBS cases, relying on estimates from French
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Polynesia for 1) the proportion of GBS cases requiring
intensive care, 2) the proportion of GBS cases requiring
ventilation, 3) the time from ZIKV symptoms to hospitaliza-
tion for GBS, 4) the time from hospitalization to intensive
care admission, 5) the time between admission to intensive
care and the start of mechanical ventilation, 6) the duration
of mechanical ventilation, 7) the time between the end of
mechanical ventilation and the discharge from intensive
care, and 8) the total duration of the stay in intensive care
(Web Appendix 2, Web Figure 1, and Web Table 1). We
documented the mean, upper bound (97.5% percentile), and
lower bound (2.5% percentile) of the number of GBS pa-
tients requiring ICU admission and ventilation. The upper-
bound value corresponds to the capacity needed to ensure
continuity of care with high probability.
For both French Polynesia and Martinique, we made the
assumption that the entire population was susceptible to
ZIKV at the beginning of the outbreak, which was consist-
ent with serological data for French Polynesia (28). We also
assumed that all GBS cases presented for hospitalization,
because of the severity of the syndrome.
Model parameters were estimated via Markov chain
Monte Carlo sampling (29). For the analysis of the epidemic
in French Polynesia, we used uniform priors for all para-
meters and evaluated the sensitivity of results to the choice
of priors. For Martinique, where less data were available—
especially at the beginning—we fixed the average infectious
period at the value obtained for French Polynesia (11 days)
and used Gaussian priors centered at the posterior mean esti-
mated for French Polynesia for all the other parameters.
In a series of sensitivity analyses we explored the robust-
ness of our findings to assumptions about priors (Web
Appendix 3, Web Table 2), the average infectious period
(Web Appendix 4, Web Figures 2 and 3, Web Appendix 5,
Web Tables 3 and 4), and the structure of the compartmental
model (Web Appendix 6, Web Table 5, Web Figure 4).
Retrospective and real-time analyses
The analysis was performed retrospectively for French
Polynesia. For Martinique, estimates and predictions were
revised whenever more data became available or past weeks’
data were updated.
Model validation
While this article was under review, estimates of sero-
prevalence in blood donors became available for 2 different
time points (30). We therefore compared our model predic-
tions for Martinique with these independent estimates. We
assumed that it takes 2 weeks for infected individuals to
seroconvert.
RESULTS
The ZIKV epidemic in French Polynesia
In French Polynesia, the Zika virus outbreak began in
October 2013, peaked in December 2013, and was over in
April 2014 (Figure 1A). By the end of the outbreak, public
health officials had recorded more than 8,000 suspected
cases of ZIKV infection. It was estimated that approximately
32,000 patients consulted practitioners for suspected ZIKV
infection during this outbreak (31, 32) (Figure 1A).
The posterior means and the 95% credible intervals for
model parameters are reported in Web Table 6. The basic
reproduction number was estimated at 1.61 (95% credible
interval (CI): 1.53, 1.69), resulting in an attack rate of 65%
(95% CI: 61, 70), consistent with the serological study that
informed inference (24). We also estimated an average infec-
tious period of 11.0 (95% CI: 9.5, 12.6) days. We found that
18% (95% CI: 16, 21) of persons infected with ZIKV sought
medical care for ZIKV symptoms. The risk of developing
GBS was estimated at 2.48 (95% CI: 1.81, 3.26) per 10,000
ZIKV infections, close to what was previously reported (14).
The average stay in ICU was 38 days (range, 2–127)
(n = 16), and the average duration of mechanical ventilation
was 49 days (range, 27–101) (n = 12) (see Web Appendix 2,
Web Figure 1).
The model satisfyingly captured the observed dynamics
of ZIKV consultations (Figure 1A), GBS hospitalizations
(Figure 1B), need for intensive care beds (Figure 1C), and
use of mechanical ventilators (Figure 1D).
The ZIKV epidemic in Martinique
The outbreak in Martinique began in December 2015. As
of August 11, 2016 (week 32 in 2016), the number of con-
sultations for suspected ZIKV infection was estimated at ap-
proximately 35,000. Twenty-six GBS cases were reported,
25 of whom had confirmed ZIKV infection.
The basic reproduction number was lower in Martinique
(1.36; 95% CI: 1.30, 1.42) than in French Polynesia (1.61;
95% CI: 1.53, 1.69), resulting in a lower predicted attack
rate of 48% (95% CI: 43, 53). We found that 22% (95% CI:
20, 25) of persons infected with ZIKV attended consulta-
tions for symptoms in Martinique, roughly the same propor-
tion as in French Polynesia (18%; 95% CI: 16, 21).
The risk of developing GBS following ZIKV infection was
1.58 per 10,000 ZIKV infections (95% CI: 1.04, 2.22). It was
lower than in French Polynesia, although the difference was
borderline significant (risk ratio = 0.65; 95% CI: 0.39, 1.00).
The model provided a satisfactory fit for the observed
dynamics of ZIKV consultations (Figure 2A), GBS hospitali-
zations (Figure 2B), need for intensive care beds (Figure 2C),
and use mechanical ventilators (Figure 2D).
Real-time analyses in Martinique
Figure 3 shows real-time estimates of model parameters
starting from week 2 in 2016. Estimates of the reproduction
number declined following a slowing down of the epidemic
growth around week 6 in 2016 (Figures 2A and 3A). Uncer-
tainty about the probability of seeking care remained high
until relatively late in the epidemic (Figure 3B). The model
predicted a borderline significant difference between Marti-
nique and French Polynesia regarding the probability of GBS
following ZIKV infection from week 8 onward (Figure 3C).
In the first week of our assessment (week 2 in 2016), when
results were driven by the prior belief that the epidemic in
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Martinique would behave like the one in French Polynesia,
we expected a total of approximately 60 GBS cases (Figure 4A),
requiring on average 12 ICU beds (Figure 4B) and 9 ventila-
tors (Figure 4C). However, the model quickly noted substan-
tial differences between the epidemics in Martinique and in
French Polynesia. By week 7 in 2016 our model was able
to correctly predict that the total number of GBS cases for
Martinique would actually be around 28 (Figure 4A), with
an average of 4 intensive care beds (Figure 4B) and 3 ventila-
tors (Figure 4C) required to manage them (upper bounds:
8 intensive care beds and 7 ventilators). It also correctly
projected that these resources would be required between
weeks 14 and 20 (Web Figure 5).
Model validation
Figure 5 shows how seroprevalence was expected to
change over time according to the model. It was very con-
sistent with the results of recent serological studies con-
ducted in blood donors on the island (13.5% seropositive
among 418 donors sampled March 9–23, 2016; 42.2% sero-
positive among 176 donors sampled June 6–13, 2016) (30).
Sensitivity analyses
Web Figures 6 and 7 show how estimates and predictions
were modified if we did not use the outbreak in French
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Week in 2013–2014 Week in 2013–2014


































































Figure 1. Epidemic curves and model fit for French Polynesia, 2013–2014. A) Weekly number of consultations for suspected Zika virus (ZIKV)
infection. B) Weekly number of Guillain-Barré syndrome (GBS) cases by hospitalization date. C) Weekly number of GBS cases in the intensive
care unit (ICU). D) Weekly number of mechanically ventilated GBS cases. Triangles denote the data. Shaded area: 95% credible intervals.
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Polynesia to inform the priors of model parameters but in-
stead used uniform priors for all parameters. In that situ-
ation, the rapid slowdown of epidemic growth around
weeks 5–7 in 2016 (Figure 2A) was interpreted as an indica-
tion that a large proportion of the population had already
been infected, with a low probability of developing GBS
following ZIKV infection. This resulted in an overly conser-
vative estimate for the total number of GBS cases (Web
Figure 7A). The model started to produce more accurate pre-
dictions from week 18 in 2016.
Given the important uncertainty about the probability of
seeking care, especially at the beginning of the epidemic,
we explored different scenarios where this probability was
fixed between 5% and 25% (Web Figures 8 and 9). After
week 16 in 2016, all these scenarios provided remarkably
consistent estimates.
We estimated that the ZIKV average infectious period
was T = 11 days using data from the outbreak in French
Polynesia. For T = 11 days, the model was able to correctly
reproduce the final attack rate and the epidemic curve. The
fit deteriorated substantially when we assumed T = 15 days
or T = 20 days (Web Figure 3). Changing this parameter did
not affect the forecasts of resources needed to manage GBS
cases in Martinique (Web Appendix 5, Web Table 3).
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Figure 2. Epidemic curves and model fit for Martinique, France, as of week 32 in 2016. A) Weekly number of consultations for suspected Zika
virus (ZIKV) infection. B) Weekly number of Guillain-Barré syndrome (GBS) cases by hospitalization date. C) Weekly number of GBS cases in the
intensive care unit (ICU). D) Weekly number of mechanically ventilated GBS cases. Triangles denote the data; grey triangles in panel A indicate
data points—not used for model fitting—with large uncertainties due to holidays. Shaded area: 95% credible intervals.
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Moreover, parameter estimates obtained for Martinique with
a model in which the average infectious period was drawn
from the posterior distribution obtained for French Poly-
nesia were identical to the estimates obtained when assum-
ing T = 11 days (Web Appendix 5, Web Table 4).
Our results were largely unchanged when we considered a
susceptible-exposed-infectious-recovered model with a la-
tency period after infection instead of a susceptible-infectious-
recovered model (Web Appendix 6, Web Table 5, Web
Figure 4). Assuming a time-varying reproduction number
(Web Appendix 7), we obtained a slightly better fit to the epi-
demic curve (Web Figure 10) without substantially changing
or improving the predictions concerning GBS cases (Web
Figure 10). Moreover, the predictions of this model were
inconsistent with recent seroprevalence estimates (Web
Figure 11).
DISCUSSION
We developed a mathematical model to characterize and
monitor the ZIKV epidemic in Martinique in real time and
assess resources (intensive-care bed capacity and mechan-




















































Figure 3. Real-time estimates of key model parameters for Martinique, France, 2015–2016. A) Reproduction number R0. B) Probability of seek-
ing care for individuals infected with Zika virus. Solid and dashed lines in panels A and B denote the posterior means and 95% credible intervals
obtained for French Polynesia. C) Risk ratio for Guillain-Barré syndrome in Martinique relative to French Polynesia. Dots and bars denote the pos-
terior means and 95% credible intervals obtained for Martinique.
Am J Epidemiol. 2017;186(10):1194–1203
Health-Care Requirements During Zika Epidemics 1199
patients. These assessments relied on the analysis of epide-
miologic data from Martinique and from the 2013–2014
ZIKV outbreak in French Polynesia. We also estimated key
parameters (e.g., reproduction numbers, the average infectious
period, and probabilities of seeking care) required to character-
ize ZIKV transmission in Martinique and allow predictions
about the overall epidemic dynamics (e.g., proportion of the
population infected with ZIKV and timing of resource needs).
To predict the trajectory of an epidemic, it is essential to
be able to estimate the number of infections, because this
number captures the buildup of immunity in the population.
This often proves difficult because surveillance systems
track only the number of consultations, and the proportion
of infected persons that seek care is often difficult to mea-
sure. For French Polynesia, the availability of serological
data meant that we were able to reliably estimate that
approximately 18% of ZIKV-infected persons sought care.
In the absence of serological data, estimation of this param-
eter remained substantially more uncertain in Martinique
and was sensitive to the choice of priors (Figure 3A and
Web Figure 6). In our initial assessments, we therefore
decided to explore scenarios with the probability of seeking
care ranging from 5% to 25% (Web Figures 8 and 9), and











































































Figure 4. Real-time estimates of the resources needed to manage Guillain-Barré syndrome (GBS) cases in Martinique, France, 2015–2016. A)
Cumulative number of GBS cases. The dashed line corresponds to the total number of hospitalized GBS cases in Martinique as of week 32 in
2016 (26 cases). B) Required number of intensive care unit (ICU) beds. C) Required number of ventilators. Dots and bars denote the posterior
means and 95% credible intervals.
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this probability based on our data and other information
available in the literature. Early in the outbreak, we favored
scenarios in which the probability of seeking care was in
the range of 5%–10% for 2 reasons. First, it is expected
that only a fraction of those with symptoms seek medical
care given the mildness of the disease. For example, only
approximately half of symptomatic chikungunya cases seek
medical care in Martinique (33). So if 20% of ZIKV-infected
persons were symptomatic, as was suggested in Yap Island
(34), the proportion of ZIKV-infected persons seeking care
is unlikely to be much above 10%. Second, the epidemic in
Martinique quickly reached a plateau, so early on, the best
model fits were obtained for small probabilities of seeking
care (Web Figure 6). However, given the prolonged duration
of the epidemic (Figure 3A), such a scenario can now be
ruled out. The probability of seeking care in Martinique is
currently estimated at ρ = 22% (95% CI: 20, 25), in good
agreement with what was found for French Polynesia, with
ρ = 18% (95% CI: 16, 21). These estimates suggest that the
proportion of ZIKV infections that are symptomatic may be
higher than initially thought. Given the difficulty of reliably es-
timating the probability of seeking care early in an epidemic,
there is a need to design new ways to monitor the buildup of
immunity in the population—for example, with studies that
document health care–seeking behaviors (e.g., surveys asking
if respondents were sick and if they sought care (33)) or new
approaches to measure incidence more directly (e.g., testing
for ZIKV in blood donors) (30).
We found that the risk of developing GBS following
ZIKV infection was 1.63 (95% CI: 1.00, 2.56) times lower
in Martinique than in French Polynesia, the difference be-
tween the 2 territories being borderline significant. A num-
ber of mechanisms could explain this difference. For
example, the risk of developing GBS following ZIKV infec-
tion could depend on ethnicity (individuals of African des-
cent compose the bulk of the population in Martinique).
This hypothesis is supported by a study conducted in the
United States during the 1976 National Influenza Immuniza-
tion Program that showed that vaccinated individuals of Af-
rican descent had a risk of developing GBS that was 2.4
times lower than individuals of other origins (35). Other
population factors could also induce differences in the risk
of GBS per infection; GBS is more likely in men and in old-
er individuals (14). However, the population of Martinique
is older than that of French Polynesia (Web Figure 12), and
the difference in the sex ratio is minimal (49% women in
French Polynesia compared with 54% in Martinique). It is
essential to better understand why the risk of GBS following
ZIKV infection may vary at a population level, because the
difference estimated in our analysis may have a substantial
impact on health-care planning. To compute the risk of GBS
following ZIKV infection in French Polynesia, we assumed
in our model that the final attack rate in the general population
was similar to the 66% seroprevalence measured in 476
schoolchildren after the epidemic (24). If the attack rate was
lower in adults than in children, the estimated risk of GBS fol-
lowing ZIKV infection would increase for French Polynesia,
leading to a wider gap between French Polynesia and Marti-
nique. Our estimate of the risk ratio may therefore be seen as
conservative. The seroprevalence estimate for French Poly-
nesia is unlikely to be affected by cross-reaction with other
flaviviruses, because in a serological survey conducted before
the epidemic, less than 1% of the individuals tested positive
for ZIKV, despite a high level of dengue seropositivity (28).
Our analysis allowed the estimation of key epidemiologic
parameters for ZIKV in both Martinique and French Poly-
nesia. We found that the basic reproduction number of
ZIKV was 1.36 in Martinique (compared with 1.61 in
French Polynesia), suggesting that the final attack rate in
Martinique would be approximately 48%. Interestingly,
independent seroprevalence estimates (30) that were con-
sistent with our predictions became available as this article
was under review (Figure 5). Our 11-day estimate for the
average infectious period was consistent with findings of a
previous study (36). For Martinique, at the time when these
analyses were performed, it was not possible to estimate the
average infectious period due to the absence of serological
data, but this parameter did not affect the forecasts of
resources needed to manage GBS cases (Web Table 3). Re-
fitting the model for Martinique, accounting for the results
from the recent serological studies, gave very similar esti-
mates of the average infectious period (12.7; 95% CI: 9.9,
16.1 days) (Web Appendix 8, Web Table 7). By comparing
predictions under different epidemic scenarios with data,
our approach made it possible to determine which were
most likely. For example, without this framework, we feel it
is unlikely that we could have predicted by week 7 in 2016
that the number of GBS patients in Martinique could be
expected to be substantially smaller than what was sug-


















Figure 5. Seroprevalence of Zika virus in Martinique, France, 2016.
The 2 stars represent independent seroprevalence estimates in
blood donors (30). The black line and shaded area represent means
and 95% credible intervals obtained from our model.
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Our analysis has a number of limitations. First, we hy-
pothesized that ZIKV transmission rates remained constant
over time. In practice, they could vary with climatic (Web
Appendix 9, Web Figures 13 and 14) or environmental fac-
tors or interventions, which might affect the epidemic trajec-
tory. Unfortunately, we could not obtain data documenting
the intensity of control measures over time that might correl-
ate with temporal variations in the transmission rate. The
epidemic in Martinique was characterized by a quick in-
crease in the number of cases with a subsequent slowdown
and plateau. This pattern might potentially be explained by
temporal variations in the transmission rate or in the report-
ing rate. Assuming time-varying transmission rates did not
strongly affect predictions about GBS cases but did provide
attack-rate estimates inconsistent with recent serological
data (Web Figure 11). Part of the minor discrepancies ob-
served between the epidemic curve and model predictions
might therefore be due to variations of reporting over time.
In practice, it is likely that the truth lies somewhere between
the models with time-varying transmission rates and those
with constant transmission rates, although the latter received
better support from the serological data.
Second, our model assumed homogeneous mixing of indi-
viduals, but spatial heterogeneities may introduce more com-
plex dynamics at local scale. Even so, our model provided
good fits to both epidemics.
Third, we assumed a simple susceptible-infectious-
recovered model structure, with cases being infectious as
soon as they were infected, but the results were largely un-
changed when we considered a more complex susceptible-
exposed-infectious-recovered structure (Web Appendix 6,
Web Table 5, Web Figure 4). There is a debate in the mod-
eling community about the level of model complexity that
is necessary to correctly capture the epidemic dynamics of
vector-born infections such as ZIKV. A previous study found
that in a context where no detailed entomological data were
available, the susceptible-infectious-recovered model was
substantially better at capturing dengue epidemic dynamics in
Thailand than was an explicit vector-host model (37). This
confirms our natural preference for more parsimonious
models in situations such as the present one, where much
is unknown about the pathogen vector. For example, while
both French Polynesia and Martinique host Aedes aegypti
mosquitoes, French Polynesia also hosts Aedes polynesien-
sis, but the contribution of either species to the spread of
ZIKV during the 2013–2014 outbreak is not yet clear (38).
Accounting for the short delay between infection and con-
sultation would generate a slight shift in the simulated tra-
jectories that would be unlikely to change our key findings.
Fourth, we assumed that GBS patients in Martinique re-
ceived similar medical care to those in French Polynesia, be-
cause the health-care practices and infrastructures in the
different French territories are comparable. This hypothesis
allowed us to use the detailed data we had from French
Polynesia in a setting where, especially at the beginning, a
similar level of detail was not available. In principle how-
ever, it would also be possible to directly incorporate in our
framework the data on ICU and mechanical ventilator needs
from Martinique and relax this assumption—for example, to
revise the estimates of the probability of requiring intensive
care or the probability of requiring mechanical ventilation
once in intensive care.
Given the pace at which ZIKV is spreading through the
Americas, it is crucial for at-risk countries to be able to assess
the adequacy of their available resources to treat patients pre-
senting with ZIKV-related complications. We have provided
such an assessment for GBS patients in Martinique, also ob-
taining important insights about the interpretation of surveil-
lance data, ZIKV epidemic dynamics, and the risk of GBS
following ZIKV infection in different populations. Similar
analyses should be implemented for other affected areas in
order to inform local health policies.
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